351 BC
THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS
by Demosthenes
translated by Thomas Leland, D.D.
Notes and Introduction by Thomas Leland, D.D.
Electronically Enhanced Text (c) Copyright 1996, World Library(R)
INTRODUCTION
To the Oration for the Liberty of the Rhodians
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AN attempt made in the hundred and fifth Olympiad to reduce the
states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to a dependency on Athens produced
the war well known by the name of "The Social War," which was for
three years supported by the Athenians on one side, and on the other
by the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines and
by Mausolus, King of Caria; which prince (or rather his wife,
Artemisia, who governed in his name) was the principal agent in
fomenting this quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged the
Athenians to give a peace to the confederates, in which it was
expressly stipulated that they should be free and independent. So
that, in effect, these states triumphed over their adversary, whose
concessions were extorted by necessity, and who, of consequence
harbored all the resentment of disappointed ambition against their
opponents.
The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy,
had formerly been indebted to Athens for assistance in defence of
their popular form of government against the favorers of
aristocracy, who, on their part, had been supported by the
Lacedaemonians. The peace now concluded promised to put an end to
those civil commotions and revolutions to which the state of Rhodes
had been exposed. But the enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now
reigned in Caria, prompted her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes.
The king of Persia favored her design against an island which, by
its situation, commanded the Egean sea, and rendered the passage
into Greece secure and easy; and which he justly expected to gain from
the Carian princess by treaty or by arms, with less umbrage to the
Greeks than any direct attack would give.
As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristocratical
faction was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices and
partly by force, established in the government of Rhodes, which they
proceeded to exercise in an oppressive and tyrannical manner. The
people, whose liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their
distress but to apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient
protector. Ambassadors were despatched to implore the assistance of
the great defenders of liberty; and in the assembly convened on this
occasion the following oration was delivered in favor of the people of
Rhodes.
Their cause labored under many difficulties. They had defied the
people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects
of their resentment. Their late opposition was considered at Athens as
the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride,
of perverseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of
their national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these
sentiments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians
ample matter for invective. It was well known that the Persian king
interested himself in favor of the reigning party at Rhodes. The
danger of irritating this prince had been by Demosthenes himself
strongly urged upon other occasions; so that not only the passions and
prejudices of the assembly, but policy also pleaded powerfully against
the present demand of the Rhodians. In these circumstances, they
required an able, artful, and insinuating advocate; and such they
found in our orator.
THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS
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Pronounced in the Archonship of Thessalus, the second year
of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad
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WHEN affairs like these become the subject of our debates, it is
my opinion, Athenians, that a general liberty of speech should be
allowed to all in this assembly. *(1) Not that I have ever thought
it difficult to point out the measures fittest to be pursued; for
(to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of yourselves sufficiently
apprised of these. But to prevail on you to pursue them- there is
the difficulty; for when anything hath been resolved, when it hath
been confirmed by your voices, we are just as far from carrying it
into execution as if it had never been resolved.
One particular there is eminently distinguishable among all those
favors which we owe to Heaven. I mean that they who not long since,
prompted by their insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all
their hopes of safety on this state; an event which should inspire
us with the greatest satisfaction: for by a just and proper conduct on
this occasion we shall by our actions gloriously and nobly refute
the calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the Byzantines, and
the Rhodians accused us of dangerous designs against them, and from
this pretence conspired to raise the late war against us. But it
will now appear that Mausolus, *(2) the great author and conductor
of this war- he who affected such zeal for the interest of the
Rhodians- is the very person who deprived them of their freedom;
that the Chians and the Byzantines, *(3) who then professed to be
their allies, have refused to assist them when distressed; but that
you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove to be the
people of all others to whom alone they are indebted for protection.
When this is once made manifest to the world, such must be the
sentiments with which you shall inspire the people of every community,
that they will regard your friendship as the pledge of their security.
And surely, you cannot enjoy greater happiness than such a universal
confidence and affection.
It is with surprise I find the very persons who urged us to oppose
the king *(4) in defence of the Egyptians now deterring us, by the
apprehensions of his displeasure, from engaging in the affairs of
Rhodes, and this when it is well known that the Rhodians are really
Greeks; the others of the number of this prince's subjects.
There are some among you who may remember that at the time when
the affairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations, I was the
first, I think the only, or almost the only, one to recommend it as
the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive
of your armament; to make your preparations against your avowed
adversaries, but to employ them even against him should he attempt
to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without your full
concurrence. You received them with applause. *(5) On this present
occasion my sentiments are exactly consonant to what I then
proposed; and were I a subject to the king, were I called to be his
counsellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I now
recommend to you- to fight for his own dominions if attacked by any of
the Greeks: never to indulge an extravagant ambition of making foreign
conquests. If on your part, ye men of Athens, it be resolved to give
up all those cities to the king which he may reduce to his obedience
by surprising and deceiving some members of the several cities, it
is a resolution I can by no means praise. But if ye be persuaded
that in the cause of justice ye should on all occasions boldly draw
the sword and encounter every difficulty- in the first place, such
occasions will occur more rarely the more you are possessed with
this persuasion; and then, it must be acknowledged that such
sentiments are worthy of this state.
That I recommend nothing new in moving you to give liberty to the
Rhodians, that you will do nothing new if my counsels should
prevail, may appear from one instance of our former conduct which
proved of important service. It may be remembered, Athenians, that you
once sent out Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes. *(6) It was
expressly prescribed in his commission that he should not proceed to
any infringement of our treaty with the king. He saw that Ariobarzanes
had openly revolted from his master. He saw that Samos was held by
Cyprothemes and his Persian garrison, and that Tigranes, the king's
own lieutenant, had placed them in this city. To Ariobarzanes,
therefore, he refused assistance! Samos he invested and restored to
freedom; and to this day we never were involved in any war on this
account. For there is a material difference between these two
motives for war- the enlargement of dominion, and the defence of
rightful possessions. When an invasion is to be repelled, the
contest is supported to the utmost: not so for the objects of
ambition. Men will indeed attempt to gratify this passion if
permitted; but if opposed, they do not charge the opposition as
injurious. Nor do I think that Artemisia will act contrary to these
principles if the state should interpose in the affairs of Rhodes.
Hear me for a moment, and judge whether my reasons be well founded
or invalid.
I think, then, that if all the king's attempts in Egypt had been
crowned with effectual success, Artemisia would have exerted her
utmost efforts to reduce Rhodes to his subjection, not from an
affection to the king, but in order to bind him by a signal favor
should he extend his dominions to her neighborhood, that in return
he might admit her to the strictest connections of friendship. But
since he hath acted, as fame reports *(7)- since he hath been
unsuccessful in all his attempts- she must suppose (and it is in
fact the case) that this island can be of no other use to him but as a
citadel to awe her kingdom and to control her motions. So that, in
my opinion, she would rather that we were in possession of the
island (provided that this did not appear to be the act of
Artemisia) than that he should gain it. Nor would she assist him in
such an attempt, at least not with sincerity and vigor. As to the
king, how he may act on any emergency I do not pretend to say. But
that it highly imports this state to have it known explicitly
whether he means to assert any claim to Rhodes or no, this I firmly
maintain. It he should, our consultations are not to be confined to
the Rhodians; our concern must be for ourselves and for all the
Greeks.
Yet, were these Rhodians, who now possess the city, strong enough to
maintain their possessions, I should not have advised you to grant
them aid: no, though they should make you the most magnificent
promises. For I find, that in order to dissolve the free government,
they first seduced some citizens to their party; and then, the
moment they had gained their purpose, they drove out those very
citizens. And they who have been false to both parties cannot, I
presume, prove faithful allies to this state. *(8)
These things I never should have urged had I only considered the
interest of Rhodes. I have no public *(9) attachment to that state; no
particular connection with any of its citizens; or, were I engaged
by both these ties, in this assembly I should be influenced only by
the interest of my country. As to these Rhodians (if one may so
speak who pleads for their protection), I rejoice at what hath
happened; that the men who could not bear that we should regain our
just rights have now lost their own liberty; that they who might
have united on terms of equality with the Greeks, and with us, the
best of Greeks, chose to admit barbarians and slaves *(10) into
their citadel, and to become their abject vassals. I had almost said
that these things must prove of use to them, if you vouchsafe your
aid. In a course of prosperity, I know not whether they would ever
have returned to reason; for they are Rhodians. *(11) But now,
taught by experience that perverse folly is the cause of numberless
calamities, they may possibly entertain sentiments more just and
prudent for the future. And this, I apprehend, would be no small
advantage to them. Let us then endeavor to avert their ruin: let us
not harbor ancient resentments: let it be remembered that you
yourselves have oftentimes been deceived by those who entertained
designs against the state; and yet on none of these will you confess
that punishment should be inflicted.
Let it also be considered that you, my fellow-citizens, have waged
many wars against states both of popular and oligarchical
government. Of this you are not to be informed: but perhaps you have
never once reflected what were the causes of your several wars with
each. With popular states *(12) your wars arose from particular
complaints, which could not be decided in a national council; or
from disputes about districts and boundaries; or from the love of
glory or pre-eminence. But of your wars with oligarchies, *(13)
there were different causes: with these you fought for your
constitution, for your liberty. So that I should not scruple to avow
my opinion that it would be better for us to be at war with all the
states of Greece, provided *(14) that they enjoyed a popular
government, than to be in friendship with them all, if commanded by
oligarchies; for with free states I should not think it difficult to
conclude a peace whenever you were inclined; but with oligarchical
governments we could not even form a union to be relied on: for it
is not possible that the few can entertain a sincere affection for the
many; or the friends of arbitrary power for the men who choose to live
in free equality.
I am surprised that none among you should conceive, that if the
Chians, and the Mityleneans, and now the Rhodians, are to be subjected
to a few, *(15) I had almost said, if all mankind are to be thus
enslaved, our constitution must be threatened with danger. It is
surprising that none among you should reflect, that if this form of
polity be established in every place, it is not possible that our free
government should be suffered to continue: for it must then be certain
that none others but the Athenians can arise to restore affairs to
their original state of freedom; and those whom men regard as
dangerous they must ever labor to destroy. In every other case they
who act unjustly are enemies only to those whom their injustice hath
immediately affected; but they who subvert free states, and reduce
them to the power of a few, are to be deemed the common enemies of all
the zealous friends of liberty. And justice too demands, ye men of
Athens, that you, who enjoy a popular government, should discover
the same concern for the misfortunes of other free states which you
yourselves would expect from them, if at any time (which Heaven
avert!) the like misfortunes should oppress you. It may be said,
indeed, that the Rhodians are deservedly distressed: but this is not a
time for such objections. Let the prosperous ever show the tenderest
solicitude for the unhappy, since none can say what may be their own
future fortune.
I have heard it frequently observed in this assembly, that when
the state was in its deepest distress, there were not wanting
friends to concert measures for its restoration. Of this I shall at
present briefly mention but one instance- I mean that of the
Argives. *(16) And I should be sorry that we, whose distinguished
character it is to protect the wretched, should appear inferior to the
Argives in this particular. They, though seated on the borders of
Lacedaemon, witnesses of the uncontrolled power of this city, both
by sea and land, yet could not be diverted, could not be deterred from
expressing their affection to the Athenians. When ambassadors came
from Lacedaemon to demand some Athenian exiles who had taken refuge at
Argos, they declared by a decree, that unless these ambassadors
departed from their city before the setting sun they should be
accounted enemies. And would it not be shameful, my countrymen, that
the populace of Argos should, in such times as these, defy the
terror of the Lacedaemonian power and sovereignty, and yet that you,
who are Athenians, should be terrified by a barbarian, nay, by a
woman? The Argives might have justly pleaded that they had
oftentimes been conquered by the Lacedaemonians. But you have
frequently proved victorious over the king; never were once
defeated, either by his slaves or by himself. Or, if the Persian
boasts to have obtained any advantage over us, he owes it to those
treasures which he lavished on the corrupt traitors and hirelings of
Greece. If ever he hath prevailed, by these means hath he prevailed.
Nor have such successes proved of real use. No: we find that, at the
very time when he was endeavoring to depress this state by the help of
Lacedaemon, his own dominions were exposed to the dangerous attempts
of Clearchus and Cyrus. *(17) Thus were his avowed attacks ever
unsuccessful, his secret practices attended with no real advantage.
There are men among you who frequently affect a disregard of Philip,
as if beneath their attention; but of the king express the most
terrible apprehensions, as of an enemy truly dangerous to those whom
he may determine to attack. If, then, we are never to oppose the
one, because weak, and to make unbounded concessions to the other,
because formidable, against whom, my countrymen, are we to draw our
swords?
There are men, too, most powerful in pleading for the rights of
others in opposition to your demands. To these I would make one
request; that they should endeavor to display an equal zeal in the
defence of your rights against your adversaries. Thus shall they be
the first to show a real regard to justice. It is absurd to urge its
precepts to you if they themselves pay no deference to its
authority. And surely a member of this state cannot pretend to a
regard for justice, who seeks industriously for every argument against
us, never for those which may be urged in our favor. Consider, I
conjure you, why, among the Byzantines, there is no man to inform them
that they are not to seize Chalcedon, *(18) which is really the
king's; which you some time possessed; but to which they have no
sort of claim: that they should not attempt to reduce Sylembria to
their subjection, a city once united in alliance with us: that in
assuming a power of determining the boundaries of the Sylembrian
territory, the Byzantines violate their oaths, they infringe those
treaties which say expressly that this people shall be governed by
their own laws. Why, during the life of Mausolus, or since his
death, hath no one been found to inform Artemisia that she is not to
possess herself of Cos, of Rhodes, of many other Grecian states, which
the king, who was master of them, ceded by treaty to the Greeks, and
for which the Greeks of those days encountered many dangers, supported
many noble contests! Or, were these things thus urged to both, that
they would have any influence, is by no means probable. I, on my part,
see no injustice in reinstating the people of Rhodes; but, even if
it were not strictly just, yet when I view the actions of others, I
think it my duty to recommend this measure. And why? Because, if all
others confined themselves within the bounds of justice, it would be
shameful that you, Athenians, should be the only people to transgress.
But when every other state seeks all opportunities of acting
injuriously, that you alone should give up every advantage, from
pretended scruples, and nice distinctions of right, this is not
justice but cowardice.
In effect, indeed, we find men proportion their claims of right to
their present power. Of this I shall mention one example well known to
all. There are two treaties *(19) on record between the Greeks and the
king; that which our state concluded, which is the subject of
universal praise; and this latter made by the Lacedaemonians, which
was condemned as odious and dishonorable. In these treaties the rights
of either party were by no means defined in the same manner; and no
wonder, for in civil society the rights of individuals are
determined by the laws, with the same equal and common regard to the
weak and to the strong; but, in political and national transactions,
the powerful ever prescribe the bounds of right to the weaker. You
assume the character of arbitrators and defenders of justice: be
careful then to preserve such power as may give due weight and
effect to your determinations: and this will be done by showing that
the Athenians are the general patrons and protectors of liberty.
Sensible, indeed, I am, and with good reason, that it is not without
the utmost difficulty that you can execute any purposes of moment. All
others have but one contest to maintain, that against their avowed
enemies: when they have once conquered these, they enjoy the fruits of
their conquest without further opposition. But you, Athenians, have
a double contest to support. Like others, you have your open
enemies; but you have enemies still more dangerous and alarming: you
have those of your own citizens to subdue, who in this assembly are
engaged against the interests of their country: and, as they are
ever strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no
wonder that many of our designs are frustrated. Perhaps those
emoluments which their corrupters hold forth to tempt them may be
the inducement to many boldly to aspire to the rank of ministers and
public counsellors. But still you yourselves may be justly blamed: for
it is your part, Athenians, to entertain the same sentiments with
regard to the rank of civil duty as to that of battle. And what are
these sentiments? He who deserts the post assigned him by the
general you pronounce infamous, *(20) and unworthy to share the common
rights of an Athenian citizen. In like manner, he who, in our civil
polity, abandons the station assigned by our ancestors, and attempts
to establish the power of the few, should be declared unworthy to
speak in this assembly. Do you think it necessary to bind our allies
by an oath to have the same friends and the same enemies with us, in
order to be assured of their attachment? And shall those ministers
be deemed truly loyal who are certainly, and evidently devoted to
the service of our enemies?
But what might be urged in accusation against them, what might be
urged with severity against you, it is no means difficult to find.
By what counsels, by what conduct the present disorders of our state
may be removed- this is the great point of difficulty. Nor is this
perhaps the time to enlarge on every particular. Exert yourselves on
the present occasion; endeavor to render your designs effectual by
an advantageous execution; and then your other interests may, perhaps,
gradually wear a fairer aspect.
It is therefore my opinion that you should engage in the affairs
of this people with the utmost vigor, and act as becomes the dignity
of Athens. Think with what joy you attend to those who praise your
ancestors, who display their achievements, and recount their trophies;
and think that your ancestors erected these trophies, not that the
view might barely strike you with admiration, but that you might
imitate the virtues of the men who raised them. *(21)
NOTES
To the Oration for the Liberty of the Rhodians
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*(1) This exordium seems to have been founded on some particular
circumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties which
Demosthenes was obliged to encounter before he could obtain an
audience: the assembly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject
to the inconveniences attending all popular meetings. Clamor,
tumult, and contention frequently disturbed it, especially when the
point in debate was of an important kind, or the popular leaders
divided, and, by interest or principle, prompted to support their
different opinions and parties with zeal and ardor. Sometimes, as we
learn from some passages in Aeschines, the leaders on one side took
care to seize the gallery, from whence the speakers addressed
themselves to the people, and by open violence prevented anyone from
taking his place there who was not a friend to the measures which they
recommended. Sometimes the magistrates who presided in the assembly
either thought it necessary for the preservation of peace and order,
or were induced by private motives to exert their authority, and to
circumscribe that liberty of speech for which the constitution of
Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence frequently arose a
tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehement
commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene fitted
to discourage and terrify an inexperienced or dastardly speaker- a
scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself by declaiming on the
seashore amid the roaring of the waves.
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*(2) This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken
to establish the aristocracy at Rhodes during the lifetime of
Mausolus. The queen, who is said to have directed and governed her
husband, probably recommended and made some progress in the
execution of a design which was crowned with complete success in her
own reign.
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*(3) It was probably the fear of Artemisia's power which prevented
the Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to
overturn the usurpation; otherwise, the Chians, whose government was
republican, must have exerted themselves to secure the like
constitution to their allies.
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*(4) When Artaxerxes engaged in a war with Nectanebus, King of
Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assistance. The
Persian was refused; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged
in the service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four
thousand of these to the assistance of the Sidonians; and probably the
greater part of these forces were Athenians, as the inveterate
resentment of this people to the Persians prompted them to take all
means of opposing them which were not absolutely inconsistent with
treaties.
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*(5) The approbation of the people he affects to consider as a
full proof of the justness of these his sentiments. "If they be then
just, the king must adopt them: no other can be recommended to him.
And if his conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be
provoked to take up arms against the Athenians by their
interposition in favor of the liberty of Rhodes, a Grecian state. It
must be equally his interest not to oppose the Athenians where his own
kingdom is not immediately attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to
give unnecessary umbrage to him. Such delicacy and caution must be
acknowledged just and necessary, but are quite different from a supine
inattention to all his motions and an abject concession of all the
conquests he may be prompted to make, however injurious to Greece.
Such conduct would not only be dishonorable, but impolitic. While,
on the contrary, vigor and resolution, prudently directed, instead
of involving them in war, must awe their enemies, and preserve them in
peace and security." This seems to be the sum of the present argument;
and the judicious will probably forgive the attempt to open and
illustrate particular passages, as the sentiments, in this oration
especially, are delivered with such liveliness and rapidity, that a
reader not strictly attentive is oftentimes in danger of losing the
full view of our orator.
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*(6) The time and circumstances of this expedition do not seem
necessary for illustrating the argument of Demosthenes, as he
himself has distinctly explained the particulars necessary for this
purpose. However, the reader whose curiosity may prompt him to seek
for further information has here a fuller account from the Italian
commentator. There is no doubt but that Timotheus was sent on this
expedition in the second, or in the beginning of the third year of the
one hundred and fourth Olympiad; because in this year Ariobarzanes,
together with some other satraps on the seacoast, Mausolus, and
Tachus, King of Egypt, revolted from Artaxerxes. The rebellion of
Ariobarzanes was probably unknown to the Athenians at this time. The
design of the expedition was to establish this satrap in the
government of Phrygia, which he had seized on the death of Mithridates
by his own authority, though possibly he might have assured the
Athenians that he had acted by the king's commission. Hence was
Timotheus sent to support him, with instructions, however, to commit
no infringement of the treaties subsisting between Athens and the
Persian; and as this general could not consistently with these
instructions pursue the intended expedition in favor of
Ariobarzanes, it was not without good reason that he chose to employ
his forces in the relief of Samos, which was under the jurisdiction of
Athens, and unjustly seized by the king's lieutenants in order to
facilitate his operations against the rebels on the seacoast. Nor
was it at all prudent for the Athenians to suffer the Persians to
possess an island from whence they might readily pass over into
Greece.
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*(7) We learn from Diodorus that in the present year, when this
oration was delivered, Ochus had not penetrated as far as Egypt, but
led his army against Sidon; which city, being betrayed by Mentor and
Tennes, its king, was set on fire and reduced to ashes by the
inhabitants. From hence the Persians marched the next year into Egypt,
where they at first met with some sinister accidents (a considerable
part of the army being lost in morasses), though in the conclusion
they were enabled to conquer Nectanebus at Pelusium, and to reduce him
to the utmost extremity. Thus the assertion of Demosthenes seems not
reconcilable to history. But it must not be forgotten, that a
passionate eagerness for intelligence was a distinguishing part of the
character of the Athenians, which, we must suppose, was frequently
gratified by rumors and advices invented to please them, and
artfully or credulously propagated. Something of this kind might
have happened at present; and agreeable news from the Persian camp,
whether believed by the orator or no, might have been assumed as
certain, without any scruple, to answer the present purpose.
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*(8) At first glance, it may occur to the reader to ask how it comes
that Demosthenes, who pleads for the restoration of the popular state,
here seems to speak in favor of the reigning party. And though the
commentators take no notice of any difficulty in this passage, it
may not be deemed impertinent to endeavor to illustrate its purport
and connection. Demosthenes has endeavored to prove that the king,
however he may favor or support the aristocracy at Rhodes, yet will
not consider the interposition of the Athenians in defence of the
liberty of that island as an act of hostility against him; and that
neither he nor Artemisia will oppose them. "Not that I pretend,"
says the orator, "to ascertain what the king's designs are, or what
measures he may pursue. But if he should assert any direct claim to
the dominion of Rhodes, his treaty with the Greeks is broken: we and
all Greece are threatened. The question is no longer how the
Rhodians shall be governed: the island must be defended for our own
sake, whatever party may prevail there. But in such a case, it is
the interest of Greece, not that of the aristocratical faction at
Rhodes, which should be considered; and however warrantable and just
and prudent a vigorous defence of the island would then be; yet still,
nothing but necessity, nothing but the certainty of its falling into
the power of the Persian, without our assistance, could induce me to
recommend the granting that assistance. If the reigning party could by
themselves defend the island, they do not merit, nor should they be
favored with, our interposition: but if not, our own and our
nation's interests require that we should defeat the designs of the
Persian against Rhodes, even though this party should reap the
immediate advantage."
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*(9) The citizens of the more eminent states in Greece had it
sometimes in their power to confer favors on inferior communities; and
these in return expressed their gratitude by declaring that such
persons should, at any time during their residence among them, be
entitled to entertainment at the public expense. In like manner favors
conferred and received by particular persons entitled them to the
rights of private hospitality from each other. These were declarations
of the most strict and inviolable friendship; and the least neglect or
violation of this hospitality was accounted a crime of the most
heinous nature. The expressions in the original are founded on these
customs.
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*(10) By barbarians and slaves he means the forces of Artemisia,
which she sent to the assistance of the aristocratical faction, and
which they kept in the citadel for their defence. The admission of
these forces into Rhodes is ascribed by Vitruvius to a stratagem of an
extraordinary nature. He tells us the Rhodians held a private
intelligence in Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, and hoped that
the inhabitants would willingly unite with them, in order to shake off
the yoke of a woman. In these expectations they sent a fleet
thither. But Artemisia, having discovered the plot, ordered the
inhabitants to range themselves under their walls, and to receive
the Rhodians as their expected deliverers. Deceived by this
appearance, the Rhodians landed, and left their ships deserted. They
were surrounded, and cut to pieces. Artemisia, who had ordered her
galleys to fall down some canals which communicated with the port, and
to seize their ships, now set sail in the Rhodian fleet, and
appeared before their island. It was supposed by the people of
Rhodes that their own army was returned victorious; and the Carians
were masters of their fortress before the fatal mistake was perceived.
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*(11) Homer called the Rhodians uperephanous, insolent. And to
this day they are said to be distinguished by the same fault, though
now reduced to the extremity of slavery.
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*(12) I imagine that the orator had here in view the expeditions
against the Corinthians and Syracusans. With the former the
Athenians contended about boundaries and territory; particular
causes of complaint, but especially ambition, prompted them to wage
war against the latter. And the government both of Corinth and
Syracuse was regularly democratical.
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*(13) By oligarchies the orator means the Boeotians and Megareans,
but principally the Lacedaemonians.
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*(14) To this the orator subjoins a reason, which makes the
assertion appear less extraordinary: "If attacked by all, it is
true, the contest could not be supported, yet no terms of
accommodation would be imposed that would alter or destroy our
constitution. But no peace could secure the freedom of the only
democratical state. The enemies of liberty, however apparently
reconciled, must ever hate and fear, and at length destroy it." The
original reads: Oste egoge ouk an oknesaimi eipein mallon egeisthai
sumpherein, demokratoumenous tous Ellenas apartas polemein umin, e
olligarchoumenous philous einai.- Demokratoum erous tous Ellenas
hath been generally taken as equivalent to tous ton Elleron
demokratoumenous, etc.; and the original understood as containing this
assertion, "It would be more eligible that all the republics in Greece
should be at war with us, than that we should be in alliance with
all the oligarchies." The learned in the Greek language will determine
whether, in order to warrant this interpretation, the form of the
sentence in the original should not have been tous demokratoumenous
Ellenas, instead of demokratoumenous tous, etc. But, not to insist
on grammatical niceties, it is submitted to the reader who attends
to the history and circumstances of Greece, whether to be at war
with the free states, that is, that states of Peloponnesus, or to be
in alliance with the oligarchies, that is (principally), the states of
Lacedaemon and Boeotia, be two particulars so necessarily incompatible
as to oblige the Athenians to choose one or the other. If it be said
that it is sufficient to suppose that particular quarrels might arise,
in which a union with Sparta and Boeotia would prevent the free states
from attacking the Athenians, and the rejecting this union might
encourage them to the attack; in such case I suspect that the orator
never could have advised his countrymen to engage singly in a war,
as the most eligible measure, which, by weakening each party, would
render both an easier prey to those who are supposed (from the
nature of their constitution) to be their common enemies. And such
advice would still be more unaccountable should it be supposed, that
in consequence of rejecting the alliance of Sparta and Boeotia,
these states would unite with the enemies of Athens.
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*(15) From this passage it seems not improbable that the designs
of the Persian had extended farther than to Rhodes, and that he had by
his power or influence lately made alterations in the state and
government of these inferior islands which the embarrassed condition
of the Athenians, and their attention to the motions of the Macedonian
king, might have prevented them from opposing.
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*(16) This instance of the magnanimity of the Argives must have been
particularly agreeable to the assembly, as the form of government at
Argos was, like that of Athens, republican. The memory of this noble
and generous act has been passed over by historians: but we have it
here preserved, enlivened, and enforced by the most vivid coloring and
the utmost strength of expression.
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*(17) In the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad the
Lacedaemonians became masters of Athens, and there established the
thirty tyrants. In the fourth year of the same Olympiad Cyrus took
up arms against his brother Artaxerxes. So that between these two
events but a small interval of time intervened; which sufficiently
warrants the assertion of the orator.
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*(18) This city of Bithynia, after various vicissitudes of
fortune, had been given up to the King of Persia by the peace of
Antalcidas. But now it appears to have been exposed in the invasions
of the Byzantines as well as Sylembria, a maritime town in the
neighborhood of Byzantium.
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*(19) The passage, as here translated, plainly points out the two
most famous treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the
one by Cimon the Athenian (An. 3. Ol. 77); the other by Antalcidas the
Lacedaemonian (An. 2. Ol. 98): the first was made immediately after
the final overthrow of the Persian forces both by sea and land. By
this treaty it was provided that all the Grecian cities in Asia should
be free and independent, and that no Persian ship of war should
presume to sail to the westward of the Cyanaean and Chelidonian
islands; that is, to approach so near as to give the least umbrage
or alarm to the Greeks; terms which plainly supposed the superiority
of Greece, and are accordingly represented by historians as highly
honorable to this nation. The latter treaty, on the contrary, was
dictated by the Persians, and the weakness and disorders of the Greeks
obliged them to accept it. By this the Grecian colonies of Asia,
together with some of the islands, were formally given up to the power
and jurisdiction of the Persian king; and historians have not
restrained their indignation at the meanness and ignominy of these
concessions.
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*(20) In the Olynthiac orations we find Demosthenes complaining that
the severity of the ancient military laws had been considerably
relaxed: and this passage furnishes us with a remarkable instance of
such relaxation; for, by the original laws and constitutions of
Athens, it was declared a capital offence for any citizen to fly, or
to desert from his post. Even he who cast away his shield was punished
with death. If any man lost it by accidental neglect he was bound to
pay a fine of five hundred drachmae.
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*(21) From the succeeding oration we learn that the address and
energy which Demosthenes exerted in favor of the people of Rhodes were
by no means effectual. The times in which he lived were distracted and
corrupted; his country not well disposed, nor indeed possessed of
force sufficient to support the general cause of liberty. The assembly
in which he spoke was (if we except some extraordinary cases of
immediate danger) ever governed by party. The citizens came
together, not to deliberate on the public interests, but to support
a faction, already determined and resolved in what manner to give
their voices, and armed against the power of truth. It is no wonder,
therefore, that we find the most consummate eloquence, the justest,
the strongest, and the most animated representations in so many
instances unsuccessful.
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THE END OF THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS
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